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BOOK REVIEWS
WHEN AMiERICANS COMPLAIN. By Walter Gellhorn. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1966. Pp. 239. $3.95.
OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES.
By Walter Gellhorn. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 1966. Pp. 448. $6.95.
Since 1961, when the existence of the Scandinavian Ombudsmen
seems for the first time to have been called to American attention, the
idea of an official protector of people affected by the exercise of govern-
mental authority has caught the professional and popular imagination.
Legislation providing for such an official has been proposed in Congress
and in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Rhode Island and Utah.' Recently, the New York
University Senate, and advisory body composed of the faculty, deans, and
administration of the University's fifteen schools, recommended that the
students of each school should be permitted to elect an ombudsman
(one of three professors nominated by the faculty) to hear student
complaints.' To date, neither Congress nor any state has adopted such
a proposal. The elected Executive of Nassau County, Eugene Nickerson,
claims to have appointed the first "ombudsman" in the country.'
These books by Professor Walter Gellhorn-written with his
usual clarity of language and style-should give impetus to the move-
ment for the creation of American type ombudsmen. For with When
Americans Complain, an expanded version of the Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures delivered in March 1966, Gellhorn steps forth as the wisest
1. Aaron, Utah Ombudsnan: The American Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 32.
Professor Aaron sets forth the texts of the bills that have been proposed, id. 62-93,
and compares the American proposals with existing ombudsman-like institutions
abroad, id. 43-61.
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1967, § 1, at 116.
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 1, at 53, col. 1; id., July 13, 1967 § 1, at 25,
col. 5. Actually, the "Ombudsman" was appointed to the office of Commissioner of
Accounts. On November 7, 1967, Nassau County voters overwhelmingly rejected a
proposal to set up the post of Ombudsman as such and give the incumbent a six
year term and annual salary of 25,000 dollars. Although the proposal put to the voters
would not have allowed the Ombudsman to investigate complaints against the police
(the district attorney's office, Judges or elected officials), the Policemen's Benevolent
Association conducted a strong and successful campaign against it. The Commissioner
of Accounts, however, continues to act as a de facto ombudsman, in which capacity he
can still investigate complaints against the police. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1967, § 1, at
159, col. 2.
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and most persuasive champion of the ombudsman idea in the United
States.
The Scandinavian ombudsman is a parliamentary commissioner or
agent empowered "to inquire objectively into asserted administrative
shortcomings."' He may launch an inquiry upon receiving a complaint
against an official act or failure to act or instance of inefficiency, arrog-
ance, or abuse. He may also do so on his own motion. He has authority
only to report to the public the facts he has found and to recommend
what, if anything, should be done about the matter. Though he must
accept the framework of existing legislative policies in performing his
duties, he may alert the legislature to the need for changes in these
policies. Whether or not his conclusions and recommendations are ac-
cepted by administrative officials, the legislature, and the citizenry, de-
pends entirely upon their merits and the respect in which he and his office
are held.
Professor Gellhorn approaches his task of evaluation from the
standpoint that increasing governmental activity to solve the problems
of our complex industrial society serves to enlarge the freedoms of the
ordinary citizen.' He is not one, therefore, to flay the bureaucracy. "The
general level of governmental performance in the United States," he
thinks, "is so high that we can now sensibly consider how to make it
more consistently excellent rather than merely tolerably good."' He also
insists that a good deal of the "bureaucratic inflexibility" which is the
butt of popular criticism is itself the result of "creakingly cumbersome
methods" imposed upon government as "safeguards against unchecked
authority."' So Gellhorn explores the ombudsman idea as a means of
lessening "individual irritation" with government and "of strengthening
personal protections without jeopardizing public policies."' His target
is "official mistake, malice or stupidity."'
Gellhorn sees the ombudsman as supplementing, not displacing, the
existing methods used to review the exercise of administrative authority.
It is an interesting fact that in none of the nine countries he studied-
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Poland,
4. W. GELLHoRN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE
COUNTRIES 422 (1966) (hereinafter cited as OMBUDSMEN).
5. W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 3 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
WHEN AMEICANS COMPLAIN).
6. Id. viii.
7. Id. 1.
8. Id. 1-2.
9. Id. 8.
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the Soviet Union, or Japan'°--are procedures for the exercise of admin-
istrative power as fully elaborated or are systems of judicial and legislative
review of administrative action as developed and comprehensive as they
are in the United States." Ombudsman-like institutions may have been
created in these countries precisely for this reason. Yet countries with
ombudsmen are beginning to look favorably upon the American system
of judicial and legislative review, and we upon the ombudsman. There
seems to be a felt necessity all over the world for a multiplicity of
"protective mechanisms" 2 against official misconduct.
Is legislative and judicial review of executive and administrative
agencies in the United States so inadequate as to require an additional,
ombudsman-like instrument of control? Yes, for a number of reasons,
replies Gellhorn. The administrative procedures which have been pre-
scribed to assure fair treatment of those affected by administrative action
have exacted their price. They have deprived the intended beneficiaries
of administrative action of the hoped-for "speed, informality, and finality
of expert judgments..'. "Contestants are often thoroughly exhausted by
the administrative remedies they must exhaust before seeking judicial
review and so they wearily drop cases that might be adjudged mer-
itorious."' 4
Moreover, not all administrative actions are subject to judicial
review." Although Gellhorn urges legislatures to authorize "more exten-
sive opportunities for [judicial] review than now exist,"' 6 he is realistic
enough to point out that even when such opportunities are available, they
are often not utilized because judicial review is deemed too costly in time
or money or inexpedient for some other reason.' For the poor and
weak in society, judicial review is a particularly inadequate remedy."8
Legislative supervision of administrative action, on the other hand, is
ill-suited to deal "with alleged injustice to an individual as distinct from
programs at large."' For these reasons, the ombudsman "could possibly
fill chinks in the protection of individuals against administrative irregul-
arities."'" Gellhorn emphasizes the importance of permitting persons who
10. Since the books were written, the British Parliament has also designated an
ombudsman. N.Y. Times Aug. 5, 1966, § 1 at 9, col. 2. The statement in the text
applies to Great Britian as well.
11. WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAINS 212-13.
12. Id. S.
13. Id. 15.
14. Id. 15-16.
15. Id. 27-30.
16. Id. 31.
17. Id. 25-26.
18. Id. 145.
19. Id. 20-21.
20. Id. 40.
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feel themselves aggrieved to go to the ombudsman even if judicial review
is available, and he criticizes the New Zealand law for precluding access
to the ombudsman in such a case.2
At no point does Professor Gellhorn permit himself to become
overly enthusiastic about the actual and potential achievements of an
ombudsman-like institution. His judgments reflect good sense and an
accute perception of the nature of modem public administration. He
warns that:
[a]dministrative critics do not produce good government. They
cannot themselves create sound social policies. They have no
capacity to organize a competent civil service. They are at their
best when calling attention to infrequent departures from norms
already set by law or custom, at their weakest when seeking to
choose among competing goals or to become general directors of
governmental activity.22
For these reasons, ombudsmen should not deal with issues that concern
the public at large; they should not try to suggest new governmental
policies or attempt to evaluate "generalized failures of law administra-
tion." These are matters best left to the political process. The ombuds-
men should concentrate upon alleged "omissions of specific duties owed
to identifiable persons or groups.
2 4
This sage advice will be hardest to follow in the United States, as is
already apparent in the experience of Nassau County. "Ombudsman"
Samuel Greason, an eighty-year-old former judge and Republican, was
asked by the Democratic Nassau County Executive who appointed him
to investigate the anti-proverty program run by the Nassau Economic
Opportunity Commission and particularly charges that the program was
a source of political patronage, with big payrolls and no accomplish-
ments. In his first report to the public, "Ombudsman" Greason disclosed
that he found no proof of payoffs or abuses in the program. 26 Immediate-
ly, the supervisor of the Town of Hempstead in Nassau County, a
Republican, charged that Greason had not "dug deep enough."2T
Much is to be gained, however, from having an ombudsman focus
on the impact of public policies upon individuals, even if he succeeds only
in removing the minor irritations caused by the exercise of governmental
21. Id. 31 n.68.
22. Id. 53-54.
23. Id. 55.
24. Id.
25. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1967, § 1 at 25, col. 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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authority.28 In Nassau County, for example, the "Ombudsman" reported
that the most common valid grievances he received concerned delays
in getting welfare checks.20 Judge Greason also acted upon complaints
by people who had their property foreclosed for failure to pay taxes yet
had never been notified of the foreclosures because the letters to them
were mailed to wrong addresses.2 " He recommended that henceforth such
letters be sent by registered mail and his recommendation was accepted. 1
Such activity by an ombudsman forces government officials to think
of the effect of their actions upon individual human beings and helps to
counteract the depersonalization which seems to be an inherent charact-
eristic of modern government.3" At the same time, because experience
shows that the ombudsman finds "only a minor fraction of complaints to
be sustainable,"33 his office helps to increase respect for public service
and the men and women engaged in it.3" The ombudsman is the bureau-
crats', as well as the citizens', defender. 5
Professor Gellhorn does not see the Scandinavian ombudsman-the
single "National Father Figure""0 righting wrongs with the help, at
most, of a small professional staff, as the prototype for the United
States." The large population of the United States and many of its
states would generate "too many grievances for one man to review.""8
But Gellhorn thinks that collegial bodies, not dependent upon the ability
and prestige of the single "ombudsman," could do the job." Emphasizing
that "no patented device has been approved for universal use,"4 Gellhorn
distinguishes the kinds of ombudsman-like institutions which would be
appropriate on the federal, state, and local levels.
"lVashington's woods are full of external critics of administra-
tion."" Federal administrative action is subject to review not only by
Congress and the courts. The General Accounting Office, headed by the
Comptroller General of the United States, "is blossoming into a highly
28. WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 40-41.
29. N.Y. Times, supra note 25.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 123.
33. Id. 44. This has also been the experience in Nassau County. The Ombudsman
reported that he handled 490 cases in his first year of service and only one out of five
was a legitimate complaint. N.Y. Times, supra note 25.
34. WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 43.
35. Id. 230.
36. Id. 9.
37. Id. 48-50.
38. Id. 48.
39. Id. 50.
40. Id. 8.
41. Id. 124.
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significant inspector and critic of public administration."4 2 The Bureau
of the Budget continues to advise agencies on how to improve their
operations, though its principal concern is program planning and govern-
ment organization and not so much the protection of ordinary citizens
in their encounters with federal authority. 3
This latter protection is now assumed-apart from the courts-
principally by individual Congressmen. The advice of political scientists
that Congressmen stop being errand boys for their constituents has been
"spectacularly unheeded."44 Gellhorn estimates that more than 200,000
complaints about administration reach congressional offices in the course
of a year.2 To obtain more reliable information than now exists about
congressional "casework," Gellhorn sampled the mail of ten representa-
tives from all sections of the country.46 The results of his valuable
investigation are not favorable to the current practice of casework on
behalf of constituents.
Gellhorn doubts the claim that the "mere possibility of correspon-
dence between constituents and congressmen 'keep[s] bureaucrats on their
toes.' "" The problems raised by constituents "rarely come to the notice
of the Congress as a whole or even of its standing committees" but "are
usually disposed of episodically in individual congressmen's offices, with-
out significantly changing the patterns of administrative policy or be-
havior."48 A great deal of such congressional activity is aimed "not so
much at justice for the constituent as at advantage for the congress-
man." I would add that the practice of constituents' casework also
helps to substantiate the unfortunate popular assumption that the federal
bureaucracy will yield to influence and pressure.
An additional cost of this congressional effort has been the increas-
ing diversion of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of
Congress from its primary duty as the most important research facility
available to Congress "until now it is also an adjunct of the legislators'
constituent relations staff.""0
As an alternative to the present system of constituents' casework,
Congressman Henry S. Reuss of Wisconsin has proposed a bill to set
up an Administrative Counsel of the Congress who would be appointed
jointly by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the
42. Id. 101.
43. Id. 103-04.
44. Id. 73-74.
45. Id. 93.
46. Id. 62-63.
47. Id. 86.
48. Id.
49. Id. 126.
50. Id. 84.
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Senate."' The Administrative Counsel would be empowered-but only
at the request of a member of Congress-to:
review the case of any person who alleges that... he has been
subjected to any improper penalty, or that he has been denied
any right or benefit to which he is entitled... or that the deter-
mination or award of any such right or benefit has been... un-
reasonably delayed, as a result of any action or failure to act on
the part of any officer or employee of the United States.5 2
The conclusions and recommendations of the Administrative Counsel
would be reported to the member who referred the matter to him and
the member, in turn, would report to his constituent on the outcome of
the case. The congressman would not be precluded from pursuing the
case further if he were dissatisfied with the outcome nor would he be re-
quired to use the services of the Administrative Counsel in the first place.
The Reuss bill would also authorize the Administrative Counsel to set
forth in his annual report to Congress "such recommendations for
legislation or further investigation as he may deem appropriate."
Professor Gellhorn sympathizes with the aims of the Reuss bill but
he discerns its weaknesses. He accepts the fact that Congress will not
adopt any proposal that might jeopardize members' "hopes of constant
reelection," which they think depend in part upon their successful handling
of constituents' requests. 3 Nevertheless, he thinks the Reuss plan keeps
the congressman too much in the very center of the picture and unduly
limits the jurisdiction and powers of the Administrative Counsel." As a
result, the kind of person who should be Administrative Counsel "might
not be tempted to so restricted and subservient a post."5
Despite Representative Reuss' efforts to placate his colleagues, his
proposal has gotten nowhere because "[i]nertia and fear have discouraged
taking even a small step that might lessen constituents' dependence on
legislators.""0 Gellhorn is still persuaded that, in time, the sheer volume
of casework confronting congressmen may force adoption of an ombuds-
man-like institution along the lines of Reuss' plan. 7
It should be recalled at this point that Congress has created a new
agency for external criticism of administrative practice-though not for
51. See H.R. 4273, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Reuss and Munsey, Proposed
Schemes: The United States, in THE OMBUDSMAN (Rowat ed. 1965) ; Reuss and
Anderson, The Ombudsmayt: Tribune of the People, in 363 THE ANNALS 44 (1966).
52. H.R. 4273, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
53. WHEN AMERICANS CoMPLA N 87, 93.
54. Id. 90.
55. Id. 92.
56. Id.
57. Id. 94.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the handling of individual complaints-which the President has only
recently begun to activate. The Administrative Conference of the United
States set up by President Kennedy,58 in which Professor Gellhorn was a
leading spirit, recommended establishment of a permanent Administative
Conference. 9 In response, Congress passed the Administrative Con-
ference Act in August 1964."0 Only a few week ago President Johnson
appointed Professor Jerre S. Williams of the University of Texas Law
School as Chairman of the Conference. Why the President waited so
long is a mystery about which Gellhorn does not speculate.
The Administrative Conference, Gellhorn explains, would have de-
cided advantages over the ombudsmen systems now in use abroad. The
federal administrative agencies, represented in the Conference, would
take part in the studies and discussions leading to the recommendations
affecting them.6' They are more likely, therefore, to be receptive to such
recommendations than to those of a single ombudsman.62 Ombudsmen
have not been conspicuously successful in gaining acceptance of their
general recommendations, including their suggestions for legislation.
Gellhorn attributes this failure to their isolation and inability to pre-test
their ideas in a forum of equally competent experts such as the Adminis-
trative Conference would furnish. 3 The Administrative Conference
would also help to strengthen intra-agency grievance handling machinery
which, to Gellhorn, offers "large hope for continuing advances in the
art and science of government."64
Professor Gellhorn hopes that someday the Chairman of the Admin-
istrative Conference "might very possibly become a sort of American
ombudsman for broad aspects of administrative functioning," analyzing
methodological problems and prescribing their solution, while an Admin-
istrative Counsel might act as a "bureau of retail casework" to "salve
individual hurts."6 " This is probably the shape of the future. But the
division of function Gellhorn envisages between Administrative Con-
ference and Administrative Counsel would have its disadvantages. The
Conference Chairman would be deprived of experience in salving indi-
vidual hurts which could contribute to his knowledge of the need for
reforming certain broad aspects of administrative functioning. And his
58. Exec. Order No. 10934, 3 C.F.R. § 464 (1959-1963 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 1332
(1964).
59. SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
60. 5 U.S.C., § 1045 (1964).
61. WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 98.
62. Id. 98-99.
63. Id. 99-100.
64. Id. 105-121.
65. Id. 97, 129.
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efforts at broad reform would proceed without the kind of awareness of
their impact upon the individual that he would gain if it were also his
job to salve individual hurts.
Possibly, the agency representatives and practitioners appointed to
Conference membership would supply the Chairman with the perception
that comes from an intimate acquaintance with individual cases. But may
it not be more sensible to assure such understanding by entrusting the
duties of Administrative Counsel and Administrative Conference Chair-
man to the same person? If Congress established an independent Adminis-
trative Counsel, his functions inevitably would overlap those of the
Administrative Conference Chairman. Would not two such posts diminish
the stature and attractiveness of each for able men?
I do not think it would matter if the person combining the functions
of Administrative Counsel and Administrative Conference Chairman
were appointed by the President rather than jointly by the Speaker of
the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate. Any Conference
Chairman, though appointed by the President, must remain an external
critic if he plays his role properly. And no Administrative Counsel, though
appointed by the Speaker and the President pro tempore, would play his
role properly if he thought his allegiance to Congress required him to
assume an attitude of hostility to the independent agencies and the
Executive establishment.
The Scandinavian-type ombudsman is more needed and suitable on
the state and local levels of government. Professor Gellhorn emphasizes
the fact that biennial legislative sessions and the relatively rapid turnover
of state legislators, their low pay, meager personal staffs, and inadequate,
often non-existing, office space make it impossible for state legislators
to handle constituents' casework to the same degree as United States
congTessmen."6 He examines and evaluates the various types of grievance-
handlers, other than courts and legislatures, which now operate on the
state and local levels-the governor and his staff, the state attorney
general, auditors, controllers and similarly titled officials, New York
City's Commissioner of Investigation, and police review boards. (His
analysis of the police review board alone is -worth the price of the book
and should be required reading for every mayor and police chief in the
country.) Gellhorn concludes that "an ombudsman-type official, with
authority to examine the entire range of municipal administration, holds
more hope for the future than does a special tribunal for trying citizens'
complaints against individual policemen."6 There is special need for
bringing the welfare, housing and educational, as well as police, authorities
66. Id. 134-35.
67. Id. 192.
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under the scrutiny of such an official 8 but this should be done in
addition to, not as a substitute for, the provision of legal services for the
poor and more compassionate legislative policies. 9
I wish I could be as enthusiastic about every aspect of Ombudsmen
and Others as I am about When Americans Complain. The longer book
succeeds in giving us an excellent picture of what ombudsmen actually
do in each of the nine countries studied. But Professor Gellhorn's attempt
to place the ombudsman in a larger political-governmental framework in
each country is not so successful. I was particularly disturbed by his
account of the situation in Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union
and will take Yugoslavia as the principal example.
Adjectives aside, says Gellhorn, referring to "communist" to de-
scribe Yugoslavia and "capitalist" to describe the United States, "Yugos-
lavia and the United States are significantly alike in outlook. ' 70 Both
countries "are seeking the good life for their people and both are essenti-
ally pragmatic in their searching."' 71 "Professedly 'communist' in philo-
sophy, Yugoslavia is increasingly 'democratic' in practice." 72
To support these assertions, Gellhorn points to the following features
of Yugoslav government and society. Each of the six republics comprising
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, like each state of the
United States, "has a separate constitution and a considerable measure
of government autonomy."7 Municipal bodies or "communes" exercise
political power at the local level.74 Each level of government has an
elected representative assembly which in turn elects the chief executive
officials for that level. President Tito and the Vice President were
elected by the Federal Assembly.
75
In recent years, economic and social decision-making has been left,
"to a very marked degree, in non-governmental hands"-that is, in the
hands of the so-called "working organizations" which "are in essence
self-managing cooperatives made up of persons directly linked with an
economic establishment or other activity." 76 Sometimes, government
intervention in the affairs of these "working organization"-"free
enterprises under a different name"-is "even more cautious than in
68. Id. 195, 204, 208.
69. Id. 199-204.
70. O-MBUDSMEN 290.
71. Id.
72. Id. 256.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. 257.
76. Id. 259.
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the United States."77 "[Clontroversy between officials on the one
hand and 'private parties' with substantial resources on the other is a
socially acceptable possibility."7 "
The Yugoslav law on general administrative procedure champions
the principle of legality and protection of the citizen's rights-particularly
the citizen's right to be heard, the right to have the decision that affects
him based on all the facts, and the right to appeal." Article 159 of the
1963 Yugoslav Constitution subjects about ninety percent of all types
of administrative proceedings to judicial review.8" Furthermore, the
authority which article 159 grants to preclude judicial review "in
exceptional cases" may itself be limited by article 150. That article
provides that the "constitutional courts, pursuant to law, shall also
safeguard the rights of self-government and other basic freedoms and
rights established by the constitution whenever these freedoms and
rights have been violated by any decision or action and other court
protection has not been provided."'" "The courts pass on the validity of
administrative procedure as well as on the substance of administrative
decisions, and they do so, with apparent vigor."8" The Constitutional
Court created by the 1963 Constitution "can pass on the constitutionality
of all federal laws and regulations .. . and can decide how to protect
'basic freedoms and rights established by the Constitution' if they have
been jeopardized by 'an individual decision or action of the federal
organs.' " "The 'independence of judiciary' is widely regarded as
an established fact.... ,8
At the same time, ombudsman-like institutions have also been
established to correct administrative errors. The public prosecutor guards
against defective administration."5 The Federal Executive Council s
has set up a Bureau of Petitions and Proposals to reinforce the right
granted to all citizens by article 37(7) of the 1963 Constitution "to
77. Id. 260, 261.
78. Id. 264.
79. Id. 265-67.
80. Id. 270.
81. Id. 270 n. 35.
82. Id. 271.
83. Id. 273.
84. Id. 269-70 n. 34.
85. Id. 280.
86. The Federal Executive Council, according to article 225 of the 1963 Constitu-
tion, is "the organ of the Federal Assembly which is entrusted with political-executive
powers within the framework of the rights and duties of the Federation" and is
"responsible for the execution of the Federation's policy" as established by the Federal
Assembly. Id. 257-58. The President designates an Assembly member to be President
of the Council and he, in turn, "proposes other assemblymen for election to" the
Council, "which also has additional ex-officio members (including the presidents of
the executive councils of the six republics)." Id. 257.
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petition and present proposals to the representative bodies and other
organs, to receive an answer to them, and to undertake political and
other initiatives of general concern. '"" And the President and Vice-
President of Yugoslavia "maintain their own grievance bureaus, wholly
independent of the Executive Council's complaint-processing machin-
"ay'88
ery. Y8
Gellhom's concluding observations are limited to criticizing what he
sees as Yugoslavia's "constant pressure to localize administration and its
supervision" and its deplorable, "almost obsessive clamor against 'bureau-
cracy.' "" Not once does he think it significant for his purposes to say
that Tito's Yugoslavia remains a one-party (Yugoslav League of Com-
munists) dictatorship. He mentions the League of Communists only to
say that though "at one time" it "dealt somewhat imperiously with
government organs," it "no longer presumes to handle complaints and
suggestions about administration, but routinely refers them to the cogniz-
ant administrative organ or to the Bureau of Petitions and Proposals.""0
Nowhere does Gellhorn venture into a discussion of the state of civil
liberties in Yugoslavia, a question which interests him greatly in evaluat-
ing the work of the ombudsmen in the Scandinavian countries and
Japan.
91
"Reality," Gellhorn wisely comments, "is not invariably governed by
texts."92 But his sense of realism seems to have forsaken him in
Yugoslavia. No adequate appraisal can be made of the Yugoslav situation
without an awareness of the relationships between the ruling political
party-the League of Communists-and the various governmental and
administrative organs in the country. The role of the party cell structure
within the various state organs escaped Gellhorns's notice.
Professor Gellhorn tells us that he tried to keep abreast of events in
the nine countries he covered until the forepart of 1966."3 Developments
in the latter part of 1966 cast grave doubt on the validity of his view
about Yugoslavia.
Gellhorn writes that each of the six republics in Yugoslavia, like
each state of the United States, has "a considerable measure of auto-
nomy."9  There are separate republics in Yugoslavia for Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins and a separate governmental
87. Id. 282-83.
88. Id. 287.
89. Id. 291-94.
90. Id. 286.
91. For example, Gellhorn strongly criticizes the Finnish Ombudsman for not
showing greater concern for civil liberties in Finland. Id. 87-89.
92. Id. 268.
93. Id. ix.
94. Id. 256.
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region within Serbia for the Albanians. Yet even in 1964, Vladimir
Bakarich, the Secretary-General of the Croatian League of Communists
charged in Nin, a Belgrade weekly, that "centralism" or "Yugoslav
integralism" had "completely superseded the constitutionally proclaimed
national federalism." ''
The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav
League of Communists, meeting at Brioni in July 1966, deposed Alexsan-
dar Rankovic, then Vice-President of Yugoslavia and ostensibly elected
by the Federal Assembly, from his offices as Vice-President, organiza-
tional secretary of the League of Communists, and Chief of the State
Security Service (Yugoslavia's secret police) and expelled him from
the League of Communists." Official reports of the July 1966 and
October 1966 Plenums of the League of Communists charge Rankovic
with being the principal saboteur of the reforms intended to achieve
the economic and social decentralization which Gelihorn saw as evidence
of "Yugoslav democratization.""9
The Plenum reports say that the State Security Service headed by
Rankovic has "created a network of collaborators within workers' organi-
zations and even within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.""8
"This network very often interfered with the entire activity of enterprises,
including even investment policy and the placement of key personnel." 9
The State Security Service also "managed to penetrate every branch of
government and every sector of public life except the army (which has
its own security service, the counter-intelligence corps)."' Tito him-
self condemned the State Security Service as "a system which has put
our entire society under oppression.""'0 The "obsessive clamor against
'bureaucracy'" in Yugoslavia, which Gellhorn deplores, masks the clamor
against the possibility of a return to Stalinism.
Professors Neal and Fick thought that the removal of Rankovic and
his group "tipped the scales decidedly in favor of the liberals, who can
now consolidate their gains and move forward into new areas of political
reform."'0 2 It had been reported, in fact, that President Tito called the
July 1966 Plenum to consider his proposals to end exclusive party
95. Quoted in Raditsa, Tito's Final Test, TEE NEW LEADER, July 4, 1966, at 7, 9.
Bakarich wrote in the March 8, 1964 issue of Ni.
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control of national administration and give elected officials and technicians
the dominant role in government." 3  This expectation has not
materialized.
The directors and subdirectors of factories continue to be party
members and each factory has a party committee as well as a workers'
council; the former is dominant.' ° Tito himself wrote in September,
1966 that
[t]he role of the League of Communists is not declining, as
is being said abroad and by our class-enemies at home. On the
contrary, its role grows and will continue to grow. It will have
to grow as long as the consciousness of our ordinary citizens has
not elevated itself to that point where it will no longer be
necessary for the Communists to guide them. The withering
away is a long process, and it does not mean the withering away
of the Communist ideology but rather the growth of the con-
sciousness of the citizens. The withering away of the role of the
Communists as an organization is accomplished by the streng-
thening of the consciousness of the whole social structure, and
thus it will be less necessary for the League of Communists to
be the teacher. But now we must be teachers. 0 5
The subsequent trial and imprisonment of Mihajlo Mihajlov sharply
etched what Tito had in mind and refuted the optimistic interpretation
that Professors Neal and Fick put on Rankovic's fall from power in the
summer of 1966. Mihajlov, who is thirty-three years old, was a member
of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Zadar and a literary
critic until his clash with the regime. Following a trip to the Soviet
Union in 1964, Mihajlov wrote a series of articles entitled Moscow
Summer, 1964.10' The first installment was published in the January
1965 issue of the Belgrade literary monthly Delo without incident. The
second was published in February 1965 and aroused almost immediate
Soviet protest, apparently because of its blunt references to Soviet slave
labor camps and their legacy. On February 11, Delo was ordered banned;
that same day Marshal Tito branded Mihajlov a "reactionary." The New
103. Raditsa, supra note 95, at 7.
104. Bailey, supra note 96, at 19. See also quotations from Yugoslav journals in
The Unspoken Defense of Mihaflo Mihaflov, TiE NEW LEADER, May 8, 1967, at 10-12.
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8, 1967, at 12.
106. Moscow Sionuner has been published in the United States by Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux with a foreword by Myron Kolatch and an introduction, notes, and bio-
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Leader published the first two parts of Moscow Summer, 1964 in its
March 29, 1965, issue and the third part, which never appeared in
Yugoslavia, in its June 7, 1965, issue.
As a result of these events, Mihajlov was dismissed from his post
at the University; he was brought to trial, convicted, and given a five
month suspended sentence. In September 1966 Mihajlov was again
arrested and placed on trial for "spreading false information for the
incitement of the people" because he published two other articles in
The New Leader,' which never appeared in Yugoslavia, and attempted
to start opposition journals in Yugoslavia. He was tried, found guilty,
and on September 23, 1966, sentenced to one year in prision. In the
course of this trial, Mihajlov was not permitted to present the defense
which The New Leader subsequently published.
Mihajlov was serving this one year sentence when he was arraigned
on April 17, 1967, on virtually identical charges plus the additional
charge of having contact with Yugoslav emigres. He was tried, found
guilty, and sentenced to four and one half years in jail and, after he
completes his term, to four years of refraining from public activity. His
colleagues in the effort to establish independent journals were also
arrested, convicted, and imprisoned."s
Mihajlov's picture of Yugoslavia today contrasts vividly with that
presented by Professor Gellhorn. Mihajlov sees Yugoslav society as
totalitarian because the League of Communists continues to monopolize
social-political life in Yugoslavia." 9 Replying to the accusation that he
had expressed doubt that Yugoslavia was a "Socialist society," Mihajlov
wrote:
I cannot consider a society to be Socialist if one insigni-
ficant minority of 6-7 percent has all the rights, which is the
case with the League of Communists, and the overwhelming
majority of the population has no rights at all in the social-
political setup. We do not even have the rights given to Negroes
in the United States-those of political association and the
right to fight legally for their own constitutional guarantees."'
Mihajlov insisted that "only political democracy can guarantee
every other kind of democracy""' and that "[e]conomic liberalization
107. Mihajlov, Why We Are Silent, THE NEW LEADER, August 30, 1965, at 3;
Mihajlov, Djilas and Yugoslavia Today, THE NEW LEADER, July 4, 1966, at 3.
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alone (which economic reform is expected to produce) is no guarantee
against a Stalinist revival if it is not accompanied by political demo-
cratization."1 2 He pointed out that he was being sentenced to prison
for the opinions he expressed in his writings, even though article 34(2)
(6) of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution guarantees "the right of every
citizen to discuss the work of state bodies and autonomous social bodies
and organizations dealing with subjects of public interest, and the right
to express their opinions regarding such work." His attempt to establish
independent journals of opinion, for which he was also being punished,
was specifically protected, he insisted, by articles 39 and 40 of the 1963
Yugoslav Constitution which guarantee "freedom of opinion and associa-
tion ... freedom of the press and other forms of informatoin, freedom
to speak freely and discuss publicly, freedom to assemble and hold public
gatherings." '
None of the ombudsman-like institutions in Yugoslavia, of which
Gellhorn writes, came to Mihajlov's aid. And so Mihajlov closed his
unspoken defense by quoting the following words Milovan Djilas had
written December 31, 1953, in Borba, the official organ of the Yugoslav
League of Communists:
In my opinion the judiciary must . . . be freed of the
recent Party intervention in its work; otherwise it cannot avoid
(however good its intentions) undermining democracy insofar
as it continues to conform in its work to political and ideological
standards, or even to local criteria. The judiciary must become
an organ of the state and the law-which means the people-not
an organ of political interest or opinion from the Party
ranks.... How long shall we use ideological instead of legal
arguments? How long will decisions be based on dialectical
and historical materialism instead of the law ?..
Undoubtedly, the tendency toward "liberalization" is stronger in
Yugoslavia than in any other communist country in Europe. But the
question is still open whether or not this tendency can ever be reconciled
with continued one-party rule by the League of Communists. By setting
up the so-called "working organizations," described by Gellhorn as
"self-managing cooperatives," the Tito regime sought to provide a
substitute for a multi-party political system. They have proved to be a
completely inadequate substitute. The prospects for the development of
democracy in Yugoslavia hang precariously in balance. There is yet no
112. Id. 16.
113. Id. 11.
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basis for concluding, as Gellhorn does, that Yugoslavia is "increasingly
'democratic' in practice." For the test of democracy is not the extent to
which the economy is decentralized but the degree of political and cultural
freedom that is tolerated.
Gellhorn's analysis of the situation in Poland is also unsatisfactory.
He begins by saying:
Perhaps unduly influenced by the political rhetoric of our
times and the over-easy generalizations of editorialists, many
intelligent Americans suppose that the peoples of countries in
the "Eastern Bloc" are governed despotically, with small oppor-
tunity to voice (let alone to seek redress of) grievances. A study
of administrative processes in Poland in the autumn of 1964
shows that at least in that member of the Eastern Bloc this
supposition is ill-founded."'
But surely the fact that the Polish people may be able to voice
grievances and even to seek to redress them does not necessarily mean
that the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party exercises power
any less absolutely or less despotically. Indeed, to give the people such
an opportunity may help the Party to maintain its absolute authority.
The crucial question concerns the areas of life in which this opportunity
is given and taken.
For example, even a tyranny may be well-advised to establish
machinery to receive and act upon citizens' complaints about the adminis-
tration of the social security system, location of bus stops, working
schedules during daylight savings time, transport service to passengers
and shippers, delays in delivering money orders sent by mail, selling
stamps that do not adhere to envelopes, leaving tenement houses in
disrepair, and similar matters which Gellhorn notes are the subjects of
such complaints in Poland. Satisfying these complaints does not in any
way threaten the continuation of tyrannical rule. But quite a different
matter is at issue when citizens' complaints begin to touch the politically
sensitive nerves of the ruling regime.
Recently, The New York Times carried a dispatch from Warsaw
by Jonathan Randal."' It reported that Nina Karsow, a twenty-seven-
year-old Jewish woman, was found guilty on October 26, 1967, of
harming state interests in violation of article 23 of the so-called small
penal code of Poland because she possessed illegal anti-state papers and
recordings and was preparing material for publication abroad. Miss
115. OMBUDSMEN 296.
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Karsow remained mute throughout the closed-door trial, which began
October 2, in protest against the decision barring public proceedings.
The presiding judge made public the nature of the charges for the
first time when he read the verdict. Miss Karsow was charged with
having in her possession a diary whose contents were said to be anti-state,
a pamphlet entitled What Is Socialism? that was described as hostile to the
regime, a pamphlet on the life of university students said to have presented
it in a false light, two tape recordings of a musical score and lyrics also
said to be hostile to the state, and a brochure by Jacek Kuron and Karol
Modzelewski said to call for the overthrow of the Polish Government.
Kuron and Modzelewski were philosophy professors at the University
of Warsaw who were expelled from the Party and jailed in 1965 for
having circulated an open letter criticizing the lack of democratic proce-
dures in the Party's decision-making. They were released from prison
early in 1967 and testified at Miss Karsow's trial.
Miss Karsow was sentenced to three years in prison. Immediately
after the sentence, Mr. Szymon Szechter, a blind Soviet army veteran
and historian and Miss Karsow's employer, charged that she had been
the victim of anti-Semitism, police brutality, and torture. He spoke to
Western reporters and Warsaw University students gathered in the dark
courthouse hallway after the police had prevented him from saying good-
bye to Miss Karsow.
Mr. Szechter said that Miss Karsow, a graduate in Polish philology
from the University of Warsaw, was arrested in August, 1966 and
"convicted for the simple fact of having wanted to think freely." "That's
what freedom is in people's Poland. Tommorrow I can be where she is
now and I am not afraid." Mr. Szechter charged that during questioning,
a police captain had "grabbed Nina by the throat and tried to strangle
her and yelled in her face, 'You little madwoman, we'll get you! We
know everything about you. Even your mother had rejected you, you
lousy Jew'." Mr. Szechter also charged that during the fifteen and one
half months Miss Karsow was imprisoned before trial, she slept on the
cement floor of her jail cell. The windows of the cell were painted out
and the only illumination was provided by an electric light bulb too
weak to read by. Warm blankets sent her reached her only after the end
of the 1966 winter. She was not permitted to receive any correspondence.
Mr. Szechter further charged that Miss Karsow had been subjected to
these inhumane conditions because she had allegedly violated prison rules.
"She couldn't make her bed by herself or cut sausage." But he ex-
plained that this was so because Miss Karsow had lost partial use of
her limbs from injuries received when her parents jumped with her
from a Nazi death train taking them to Treblinka extermination camp
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near Warsaw in 1943. Mr. Szechter said that a doctor had examined
Miss Karsow and determined that "she was in such delicate health
that she was incapable of standing trial."
Professor Gellhorn was made aware of the presence of the Party
and its secret police in minor ways. Several persons with whom he
wished to speak declined to talk in places in which they suspected
listening devices might record the conversation or in which their meeting
with an American might be too conspicuous.11 ' He encountered "inces-
sant interference" with and censorship of his mail. 1 ' Yet his overall
judgment remains charitable. Poland has not "reverted to being a police
state.""' It is simply that Poland is not "monolithic."" 0 Within the
United Workers' Party, "conservative and progressive elements compete
for control much as they do in the Republican Party and the Democratic
Party in the United States.' 2 ' Although in late 1964 "a somewhat
uneasy advantage lies with what might be characterized as the liberals"
... "neo-Stalinist elements" have a "continued grip" upon "the State's
security apparatus.' 2' As a result, "many Poles are still unconvinced
that, as the Constitution assures them, they may freely and safely
complain about any and all governmental behavior of which they dis-
approve.'
12 3
This is the place to reiterate Gellhorn's saying that "[r]eality is not
invariably governed by texts." The Russian Procuracy was created by
Peter the Great not only to enforce the laws "but also to protect the
population from overbearing officials. ' 1 24 Yet the procurators did not
protect the people from Czarist despotism. Since at least 1936, when the
Soviet Constitution was adopted, Soviet citizens, as Gellhorn notes,
"have had a generally worded statutory right to complain to almost
everybody about almost anything."' - Yet the Constitution-proclaimed
by Stalinists as the most democratic in the world-did not prevent
Stalin from ordering the slaughter of tens of millions of people, with the
resulting utter degradation and helplessness of the individual in the
Soviet Union.
But Gellhorn is optimistic even about future prospects in the Soviet
Union. "Post-Stalin leaders have sought to restore respect for law,"
he writes and to this end, "they have fortified personal rights against
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invasion by officials." 126 The Procuracy, in particular, "has considerably
reinforced 'socialist legality'."' 27 However, the evidence which Gellhorn
adduces to support this conclusion does not gainsay Professor Harold
J. Berman's view-noted by Gellhorn that "it remains true that the
Procuracy is helpless to enforce Soviet Law against the wishes of the
Party leadership, and, moreover, that its efforts are usually directed
against those abuses that the Party leadership desires to eradicate."' 28
Nevertheless, Gellhorn concludes that "legality as it bears on indivi-
dual interests, quite apart from the supposed 'interests of the State' may
have become an abiding concern and not merely a momentary tactic"
of the Soviet leaders."' Again, this conclusion can be tested by subse-
quent events. And it appears to be fragile indeed in the light of the trail
and imprisonment of Soviet writers Yuri Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky
on charges of having published anti-Soviet works abroad."' This act
of repression has been followed by arrests, imprisonment, and secret
trials of other writers and students who came to the defense of Sinyavsky
and Daniel."'
Certainly the ice of totalitarianism is breaking and thawing in the
Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe. But it is not incumbent
upon intellectuals in the West to underestimate the continued suppression
of freedom by the ruling Communist regimes. Our understanding and
support should be extended to the courageous and lonely men and
women who risk persecution in the fight for freedom against these
regimes. We do them a great disservice by blurring the line between
their democratic and liberatarian aspirations and the realities which
they seek to displace.
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